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COMMENTS
justifying it on the questionable theory of vested rights. As
stated by Professor Stumberg, "Its greatest virtue is its simplicity,
the facility of its application."'
It is eminently clear that the jealous adherence to this rule
will lead to hardship in many cases. As has been pointed out
above in the cases referred to, the courts have realized this fact
and, upon considerations of sound social policy and basic tort
theory, are leaning toward applying the law of the place where
the tortfeasor acted. It is submitted that this solution to the prob-
lem produces a more just result and better serves the social func-
tion of the law.
SIDNEY E. COOK*
CHOICE OF LAW IN MULTISTATE LIBEL SUITS
It is generally considered axiomatic that the creation and
extent of tort liability is governed by the law of the place of
wrong.' The place of wrong is defined as the place where the
impact occurs upon the interest alleged to have been violated.2
As the interest protected against defamation is that of a person's
interest in his unblemished reputation, 3 the place of impact is
said to be where the defamatory statement has been communi-
cated to third persons.4 Obviously, such a rule results in difficul-
ties where an allegedly defamatory statement has been published
in a newspaper or magazine which has been circulated through-
out the nation or even into foreign countries. With communica-
tion to third parties in every state and an impact resulting from
each communication,3 we are confronted with a dilemma as to
which law to apply. Furthermore, in mass publication of defama-
tory matter, we are faced with the closely related task of deter-
31. Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 182.
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Shreveport Bar.
1. 62 C.J. 1109, § 27-28; 15 C.J.S. 896, § 12; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(3 ed. 1949) 260; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 163.
2. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377; "The place of wrong Is
in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for a
tort takes place." See, e.g., Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11
So. 803 (1892) (train negligently repaired in State X moves into State Y
where P is injured. Law of Y governs.); Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass.
109 (1875) (Dog strayed from State X and bit P in State Y. Law of Y gov-
erns.).
3. Restatement, Torts (1938) § 559: "A communication is defamatory
if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estima-
tion of the community or to deter third persons from associating with him."4. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377, comment (a), note (3):
"Where harm is done to the reputation of a person, the place of wrong is
where the defamatory statement is communicated."
5. Ibid.
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mining whether each publication to a third person creates a
separate tort or whether there is but one cause of action, each
new publication being but an aggravation of the original libel.
Under the traditional approach, every time a defamatory
article is brought to the attention of a third person, a new pub-
lication, giving rise to a new and separate cause of action, is re-
garded as occurring.6 This doctrine still has its advocates, 7 notably
the Restatement of Torts." However, most states,9 including Lou-
isiana,'0 have found this approach ill-suited to the needs of a
society demanding mass publication. If every copy of a separate-
ly delivered newspaper is a distinct offense, then a newspaper
with a circulation of 100,000 may be guilty of that many of-
fenses." Such a conclusion would be unworkable. Consequently,
the single publication concept evolved as a practical necessity of
protecting the defendant from innumerable harassing actions
and as a means of facilitating the judicial process. As a consistent
extension of this policy, the courts have permitted the plaintiff
to make a general allegation that the defamatory matter has
been printed and extensively circulated, rather than require him
to plead and prove each separate sale.' 2 By strictly adhering to
the view of the Restatement of Torts, 3 we would not only create
doubt as to the effect of res judicata, 4 but the statute of limita-
tions would run indefinitely and its very purpose would be de-
6. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 18 Q.B. 185, 17 Eng. Reprint 75 (1849);
Cook v. Conners, 215 N.Y. 175, 109 N.E. 78 (1915).
7. Newell, The Law of Slander and Libel (4 ed. 1924) 236, § 192; Ogders,
Libel and Slander (4 ed. 1924) 132; Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp.
24 (E. D. Wash. 1943), appeal dismissed, 144 F.(2d) 249 (C.C.A. 9th, 1944).
8. Section 578, Comment (b): "Each time a libelous article is brought
to the attention of a third person, a new publication has occurred, and each
publication is a separate tort. Thus, each time a libelous book or paper or
magazine is sold, a new publication has taken place which, if the libel is
false and unprivileged, will support a separate action for damages against the
seller."
9. E.g., Means v. MacFadden Publications Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.
N.Y. 1939); Cannon v. Time Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. N.Y. 1939); Backus
v. Look Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. N.Y. 1941) Hartmann v. Time Inc., 64 F.
Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala.
40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Winrod v. Time Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.(2d) 708
(1948); Bigelow v. Sprague, 144 Mass. 425, 11 N.E. 674 (1886); Forman v.
Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 190, 14 So.(2d) 344 (1943); Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908).
10. Brian v. Harper, 144 La. 585, 80 So. 885 (1919).
11. Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193
(1921).
12. See, e.g., Brian v. Harper, 144 La. 585, 80 So. 885 (1919).
13. See Restatement, Torts (1938) § 578, Comment (b), quoted in note
8, supra.
14. Clark, J., dissenting in Sidis v. F-K Publishing Corp., 113 F.(2d) 806,
811 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711, 61 S.Ct. 392, 85 L.Ed. 462 (1940).
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feated. 5 It must be conceded, however, that the application of
the single publication rule in conjunction with the statute of
limitations and doctrine of res judicata may result in certain
inequities. The defamed person could be barred from maintain-
ing suit by the statute of limitations and on principles of res
judicata at a time when he is still sustaining injury to his repu-
tation. 16 From a practical standpoint, the hardship is conjectural,
for newspapers and magazines are of ephemeral interest, and
circulation of out-of-date issues is not likely to occur. When it
occurs, the tendency is to deny that the sales are part of the same
mass distribution process and hence are not included in the single
publication rule.1'7 Even granting these shortcomings, considera-
tion of the primary objectives of the single publication rule should
lead the courts to the conclusion that the additional publications
are only a repetition of the original libel and should be admis-
sible only to prove the extent of the defamatory charge and the
quantum of damages.' 8
For a truly expeditious trial, it is necessary that this single
publication doctrine be supplemented by a single choice of law
rule. Unfortunately, there has been little judicial discussion con-
cerning a choice of law rule in multistate libel cases. The deci-
sions that have squarely met the problem are of little aid in the
development of a workable solution. For instance, in O'Reilly v.
Curtis Publishing Conpany,19 plaintiff sued in Massachusetts for
an alleged libel in that state and then, in a new action, for harm
alleged to have been sustained through the circulation of the
same statement in thirty-eight additional states. He claimed in
the second action punitive damages, which are not obtainable
under Massachusetts law. The defendant's plea for abatement of
the second suit was rejected upon the ground that that suit was
not upon the same cause of action as the first. "The publication
in each of the thirty-eight states," the court said, "gives rise to
separate causes of action. '2 As to obtaining punitive damages,
the court stated, "The defendant's liability for the libel published
in such state is governed by the laws of that particular state."'2'
Decisions such as this lead to that interminable litigation that the
15. Winrod v. Time Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E. (2d) 708 (1948).
16. Note (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 558.
17. Winrod v. McFadden Publications Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill.
1945).
18. An excellent survey of this topic can be found In Note (1949) 62
Harv. L. Rev. 1041.
19. 31 F.. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
20. Id. at 365.
21. Ibid.
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single publication theory is designed to eliminate. Hartmann v.
Time, Incorporated,22 resulted in an equally undesirable decision.
Suit was brought in Pennsylvania for an alleged libel circulated
throughout the United States and all other civilized nations. The
court found that Pennsylvania had adopted the single publica-
tion rule, and that the magazine containing the alleged libel was
circulated from Pennsylvania. It held that the Pennsylvania sta-
tute of limitations determined whether or not the action was
barred with respect to all states and countries also following the
single publication rule. However, in as far as the suit was con-
cerned with harm suffered in states or countries not following
the single publication rule, the case was remanded to the trial
court with directions to ascertain for each such state and country
whether or not its statute of limitations had run. The end result
of the decision is that the courts are placed in the position of
having to wade through the laws of forty-eight states and an in-
definite number of countries. A forum with an internal single
publication rule practically defeats its own policy by adoption
of a multiple publication rule for conflict of laws purposes.28
In several cases, the courts either have ignored the conflict
of laws problem 24 or have recognized the problem without decid-
ing it.25 This fact is an indication that the courts prefer to by-pass
the question rather than plunge into the difficulties created by
the present state of the law. 26
Assuming that it is desirable in choice of law cases that there
be a rule resulting in the application of just one law, the question
arises as to where a multistate defamation should be localized.
An analysis of the cases on multistate libel reveals that the diffi-
culties have resulted mainly from an attempt by the courts to
apply to the tort a localization developed in other connections.
Obviously, it is important to know where and to how many
people the libel is communicated.2 7 Yet, why should we look to
22. 166 F.(2d) 127 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1948), cert. denied 334 U.S. 838 (1948).
23. See Note (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 146.
24. Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., 48 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1942);
Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930).
25. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 151 F.(2d) 733 (C.C.A. 2d,
1945), cert. denied 326 U.S. 797, 66 S.Ct. 822, 90 LEd. 1041 (1946); Spanel v.
Pegler, 160 F.(2d) 619 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947).
26. The recent case of Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 176 F.(2d)
897 (C.C.A. 2d, 1949) is an excellent example of the difficulty of applying
the law of the place of wrong in multistate libels. The United States Circuit
Court of Appeals said the place of wrong was at the plaintiff's domicile for
that was the only place he suffered damages, even though there was wide
circulation of the publication in other states.
27. Sutherland, Damages (3 ed. 1904) 3490, § 1207.
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the same factors as far as conflict of laws is concerned? Seem-
ingly, it is because the courts are assuming the very thing they
are called upon to decide, that a right of action accrued there. 28
Instead of employing this circuitous method to ascertain a choice
of law, it would seem more proper to formulate a principle based
on the very fact that a court, in a case having foreign contacts,
looks to foreign law at all rather than simply applying its own
law in all cases properly before it. Why do courts ever apply
the law of another state or country? They seek to apply that
law which will best protect both the justified expectations of the
parties appearing before it and the governmental interests of the
states or countries affected. 29
Since libel consists of an invasion of a person's interest in
his reputation and good name,3 0 it would seem appropriate to
apply the law of the state where the plaintiff's most significant
social interests are centered. This suggests a domicile approach.
1
The rationale of this proposal breaks down, however, when the
area of publication is limited to states other than the plaintiff's
domicile. Another possible solution was presented in Banks v.
King Features, Incorporated.2 In an attempt to apply the "last
event" doctrine of the Restatement of Torts, 3 the court held that
liability for the invasion of the right of privacy was to be deter-
mined under the law where the seal of privacy was first broken.
Though this doctrine of the "first impact" might be suitable for
an invasion of privacy, it becomes unworkable in multistate libel
suits. The tort of defamation and the tort of invasion of privacy
are concerned with the protection of different interests. The in-
terest protected against defamation is that of a person's interest
in his unblemished reputation.8 4 The interest protected against
invasions of privacy is a person's interest in peace and solitude.83
Thus, by the very nature of the right of privacy, the wrong can
occur only at one place, where the person's solitude is infringed
upon, which is wherever the person happens to be at that time.
On the other hand, since the place of wrong in defamation is
28. This idea of a vested right has been severely attacked in Yntema,
The Hornbook Method and Conflict of Laws (1928) 37 Yale L.J. 468; Rhein-
stein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law (1944) 19
Tulane L. Rev. 4.
29. See Rheinstein, supra note 28, at 20.
30. See Restatement, Torts (1938) § 559, quoted in note 3, supra.
31. This theory has been proposed In a Comment (1947) 60 Harv. L.
Rev. 941. See also Note (1949) 43 Ill. L. Rev. 556.
32. 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
33. See note 2, supra.
34. See Restatement, Torts (1938) § 559, quoted in note 3, supra.
35. See Prosser, A Handbook on the Law of Torts (1941) 1050.
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wherever the defamatory statement is communicated,36 there
may be simultaneous impacts occurring in many jurisdictions,
making ascertainment of the "first impact" impossible.
Because we are dealing with a conflict of laws problem, it
appears appropriate to localize the wrong-7 so as to result in the
application of only one law. This means localization at the place
which is the most "essential" in the situation, the place where the
situation has its "center of gravity."
Suggestions in that respect may be derived from the field of
unfair competition, and copyright and trademark infringements, 3s
where the courts are perplexed with a similar problem of localiz-
ing a tort producing impacts in numerous places. Faced with this
difficulty, several courts have felt compelled to look to the place
of the most basic element of the wrong and not to the place of
each individual illegal act. Especially noteworthy among these
decisions is the case of Addressograph.Multigraph Corporation v.
American Expansion Bolt Manufacturing Company.3 9 In Illinois,
where the suit was brought, defendant manufactured certain
devices to be used in machines manufactured by the plaintiff,
without plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff claimed that this action
of the defendant constituted unfair competition as such or at least
in those places where the defendant's product would be palmed
off as a product of the plaintiff. When it appeared that the
plaintiff's claim could not be fully maintained under Illinois law,
he pleaded that the tort be regarded as having been committed
at all those places where the defendant's products were sold to
the public. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
rejected this contention and held that the tort was committed at
the place where the defendant's product was manufactured. The
court said:
"The main charge of unfair competition was a misappropria-
tion by the defendant of plaintiff's business system. The
essential element of this alleged wrong was the manufacture
and sale by the defendant of plates for the purpose of use in
certain machines manufactured by the plaintiff. Defendant's
36. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377, comment (a), note
(3), quoted in note 4, supra.
37. 2 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (1947) 322, has
previously suggested that a characteristic locality be found to determine a
choice of law rule.
38. For a complete discussion of all the cases in this field as regards
conflict of laws, see Note (1947) 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315.
39. 124 F.(2d) 706 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941), cert. denied 316 U.S. 682, 62 S.Ct.
1270, 86 L.Ed. 1778 (1942).
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place of business was in Illinois where it received and filled
orders for such plates. The wrong, if such it be, was the
sale in Illinois for the use indicated. '4 0
In Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publica-
tions,41 plaintiff sued to enjoin copyright infringement and unfair
competition caused by defendant's nationwide publication of
horse racing information derived from plaintiff's periodicals. In
deciding on a choice of law, the Federal District Court for Massa-
chusetts said:
"In considering the question of unfair competition, I must
apply the law which the Massachusetts courts would apply.
... In view of the fact that defendants prepared all of their
material in Massachusetts and the further fact that the
greater part of the competition occurred in Massachusetts, I
should suppose that the Massachusetts state courts would
apply only the Massachusetts law of unfair competition.
Even if some part of the defendant's papers were sold in other
states (which is not clear in the evidence) the Massachusetts
courts, in determining the issues of damages, would probably
not apply to such sales the rules of unfair competition pre-
vailing in these states.
'42
Several observations are to be drawn from these and other
cases. 43 First, as a result of the characterization of the basic
element of the wrong, there is a marked tendency to look to the
place of acting and to turn away from the place of effect. Second,
a more appropriate localization can be achieved by centering the.
place of acting at the defendant's main place of business,44 which
is the focal point from which a nationwide tort usually emanates.
It is the opinion of the writer that the law of defendant's
principal place of business can be applied successfully to multi-
state -libels. In every libel the most essential element of the
wrong is the publishing of the defamatory article, even though,
as regards damages, communication to third persons is an essen-
tial element. 45 If this be true, it would seem to follow that the
40. 124 F.(2d) 706, 709 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941), cert. denied 316 U.S. 682, 62
S.Ct. 1270, 86 L.Ed. 1778 (1942).
41. 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942).
42. Id. at 203.
43. Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Rosen, 108 F.(2d) 632 (C.C.A. 6th, 1940);
Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.(2d) 73 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943).
44. Comment (1948) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 164, has advocated the adop-
tion of the principal place of business. Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of
Law (1942) 253 suggests the law of the place of broadcasting to radio
slanders.
45. See Sutherland, loc. cit. supra note 27.
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appropriate governing law is the law of the principal place of
defendant's business. Because the printing process of a national
periodical often extends over several states46 the selection of the
law of the main publishing office 41 will avoid complications in
locating the proper phase of the printing process.
Not only would the rule be simple in its application, but the
defendant would also be able to predict with fair accuracy
whether his actions will subject him to a suit for damages. 4
Before publishing an article, it is only natural that he look to his
own law regarding his liability for defamatory material rather
than to the law of some state or country where the article might
be accidentally circulated. As far as the plaintiff is concerned, he
can justifiably expect only that his recovery of damages will be
governed by an appropriate law. Nevertheless, to be certain that
no undue burdens are imposed on the plaintiff, an alternative
application of the law of the state of circulation is suggested, if
action is brought there and damages are limited for the harm
suffered in the state of the forum.49  Therefore, the plaintiff
seldom will have to travel to a foreign state in order to bring
suit.
Because the precise problem of a choice of law rule in multi-
state libels never has been presented in Louisiana, the courts are
in a position to turn to any theory. The decision of State v.
Moore5" perhaps can be said to be one step in the direction
towards the proposed rule of this article.
DONALD L. PELTIER
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES-THE REQUIREMENT OF
SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that the right of parties
to a contract to have their reciprocal duties and obligations under
46. Cannon v. Time Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) (composition
in one state, printing in another state, and distribution was handled from
still another state).
47. See 2 Rabel, loc. cit. supra note 37. Professor Rabel also advocates
the law of the main publishing house.
48. Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W.Va.
L.Q. 156, 167-168 (emphasizes predictability). See also Rheinstein, loc. cit.
supra note 29.
49. Wright v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944);
Kelley v. Lowes Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
50. 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916) (in interpretation of venue statute, the
supreme court held that the criminal libel was committed at the place of
printing and publication and not in the parishes where circulated). However,
Vicknair v. Daily Publishing Co., 144 La. 809, 81 So. 324 (1919) distinguishes
the Moore case on the ground that it was a suit for criminal libel.
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